As the author of A Metaphysics for Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), I respond to each of the preceding eight papers in this Special Issue.
potentially consistent with determinism, without at the same time endorsing an account that falls foul of my main criticisms of the Causal Theory of Action. I am still not completely sure I have entirely understood the account -but thinking about it in connection with the problem of deviant causal chains has helped me see what its role is supposed to be in Broadie's argument. Broadie claims that any causal theory which seeks to reduce agency to a causal relation between the creature's being in a certain psychological state (the cause) and the creature's moving in a certain way (the effect) would 'locate … the causation in the wrong place'. 2 The central whyrelation involved in agency, according to Broadie, holds between something we can call an item intentionally present to the subject (which might, for example, be a reason in the case of a human being, or perhaps an object wanted, or place to be reached, for a non-human animal) and what Broadie calls the start and continuation of a movement, here meaning not, I think, a movement T , in Hornsby's sense (e.g. not a raising, by S, of her arm)-but a movement I (e.g. a rising of an arm which happens to be S's).
I confess to having been puzzled, at first, as to why Broadie is so insistent that the causal relation central to agency must not be placed 'between events or states of affairs or facts of which [the agent] is a constituent'. 3 Cannot the fact that John wants to be rid of the burden of supporting his companion cause, or at least causally explain, the fact or event of his letting go of the rope? But thinking about deviant causal chains has made me understand why Broadie is inclined to say what she says. Consider this: the fact that John wants to be rid of the burden of supporting his companion can be causally relevant to the fact or event of his letting go of the rope in the wrong way-by, for example, making him nervous in such a way that his hand involuntarily opens-so the fact that such a causal relationship exists cannot be constitutive of agency per se, since in this case, an action has not occurred at all. What we need, then, is a causal relation between kinds of entity which is such that, when instantiated, it simply guarantees that an action had occurred, so that causal deviance is not possible. This is what the relation between the items on the right hand side of Broadie's diagram is supposed to accomplish, I think. Where the presence of an intentional item of the right sort, in the causal field which is S, causes the start and continuation of a movement, we have an action. And since we have said what an action is without having to invoke any of the talk of settling, or things being up to the agent, which motivated Agency Incompatibilism, we have undermined that thesis.
Let me register two worries about Broadie's suggested model of the causation involved in agency. The first is a version of a worry raised by Broadie herself-it is the worry about how an intentional item as such can actually generate a full-blooded physical movement. Can it do so? If so, how? Broadie notes that it is unlikely to appease those philosophers who feel uncomfortable about this suggestion to remind them that the movementgeneration in question only occurs in creatures such as are capable of hosting the type of causal nexus she has in mind. In fact, it is sufficient, in a way, to appease me-and so far as the cause is concerned, I feel quite persuaded by the points Broadie makes about how reasons-the explanantes-are best identified not with subjects' believings and desirings but with what is desired and believed, and with her reminders about the nebulousness of the concept of cause. My concerns lie not so much with the causes in Broadie's story, as with the effects. Can a content (or other simpler intentional item) give rise to a sheer physical movement, except by way of an action? Surely what is explained by intentional contents, at least of the propositional sort-contents such as 'It was hot' or 'He was heavy', things we might offer as reasons for things we have done is, first and foremost, such things as why I opened the window or why the climber loosened her grip. And these propositions make claims not about movements I , but about movements T -about actions. Movements I may of course then be explained in their turn when they happen as a result of actions-but the primary nexus is surely between content and action (or proposition concerning action). And now we are back facing a version of the difficulty I raised in Chapter 3 concerning the disappearance of the agent. We were trying to give a causal account of the nature of action in which the existence of a causal relation between certain sorts of thing was (in its entirety, as it were) to constitute an action. But it has turned out that actions are needed within the chain itself-to be the link that connects intentional item to movement. And this, according to me, is no accident. As I put it in A Metaphysics for Freedom:
It is the agent who has to settle the question whether . . . mental antecedents will result in a movement or not. That is the way commonsense psychology tells the story of action, and it cannot be retold at this level of ontology without her participation. 4 The result is that no attempt to reduce the occurrence of actions to the existence of causal relations between entities whose effect-end is a mere movement I is going to work. The agential input constitutive of action is needed within the chain of causation.
My second worry is also one that Broadie anticipates-namely, that Broadie's account of agency might seem to make essential to action something that is not in fact essential to it, namely, the presence in the 'field' of an intentional item. According to Broadie, in a typical case of animal agency, this will be an object, O, which is cognitively present to the agent as a goal or object of aim-for example, food, or a place of safety. Broadie has in mind, clearly, a typical case of purposive action. But I remain worried about the vast array of small movings that we and other animals effect during the course of our lives which seem to me agentive and yet where there is no obvious intentional item of this kind in view. To those who are inclined to believe that these are marginal and unimportant phenomena, I advocate a period of, say, ten minutes of close attention to one's own bodily movings. One will be scratching one's ear, crossing and uncrossing one's legs, licking ones lips, swallowing, etc.-and these phenomena feel agentive. I submit that they are our doings-and need to be incorporated by any fully accurate account of agency.
One possibility, I suppose, is that one might try out the idea that the body itself-or some relevant part or parts of it-is the object that is cognitively present in the case of these sorts of sub-intentional agency. The idea of cognitive presence will have to be read in a very minimal way if this is to be plausible, given that sub-intentional actions are often performed in the absence of intentional awareness-but perhaps it is not impossible that some suitably minimalistic account of cognitive presence might be forthcoming. After all, there is something which seems right about the general idea that the body is always, in some sense or other, an object of awareness to an embodied creature. And if the account is to do for the wide variety of animals that I think ought to be regarded as agents, it might be argued that a very minimal account of cognitive presence is in any case going to be needed if an account along Broadie's lines is going to work. I offer that suggestion up, at any rate, as a possibility for consideration; it seems to me a not implausible means of enfolding sub-intentional agency within the category of movings started and continued in response to the cognitive presence of an intentional item. But it seems to remain true that it is movings (and not movements) thus started and continued that remain at the heart of the account-and hence no reduction of agency has been attained.
II. Response to Karin E. Boxer
I want to begin my response to Karin E. Boxer's thought-provoking paper by simply conceding (as I concede in my responses to some other authors) that she is quite right to say that there is too much focus in A Metaphysics for Freedom on one particular type of compatibilism, and that I say rather too little about some of the other types that might be conceivable. I think perhaps my concentration on the reductive style of compatibilism which I attempt most directly to undermine-the kind that conceives of the determination of effects by agents as reducible to the determination of those same effects by events and states occurring or obtaining in those agents-was a result of the fact that this seemed to me to be the type of compatibilist thinking about agency that most dominated the literature I was particularly concerned to oppose-a literature in which various familiar forms of physicalism and functionalism are the favoured accounts of mental causation. But of course, Boxer is right to say that compatibilism, no less than incompatibilism, comes in many forms, and that I have not said enough about some of the alternatives to the reductive types of view I oppose directly. In this response, then, I shall try to make a few remarks about the sort of compatibilism that Boxer herself suggests might replace the reductive form I criticise-and attempt to argue that contra Boxer, my argument does indeed have force against this proposed alternative. The second thing I shall try to do is to seize a welcome opportunity to correct a misapprehension about the view of settling to which I am committed-and, in particular, to deny Boxer's suggestion that, on my account 'settling begins where reasons end'.
Boxer's favoured form of compatibilism answers the question what it is to have the power to make one's body move in certain ways 'at will' in terms of a power to make one's body move in those ways as and when one wills to move it in those ways. To avoid the perils of volitionalism, it is then specified that willing is neither a purely mental phenomenon, nor one that takes place prior to the action itself. Rather, willing is to be explicated in terms of trying. When trying is successful, the trying is simply identical with the action, rather than being its prior cause. But if willing is to be explicated by means of trying, it is surely permissible and natural to ask what it is to try? Trying has now itself become the locus of all the interest that was originally focused on the concept of agency-indeed, it is an instance of the phenomenon, as Boxer herself agrees; she says that trying is 'intrinsically active'. But this seems to mean that we now need to ask the question whether our tryings are the sorts of things that could be deterministically produced events, if we want to know whether compatibilism is true. And the compatibilist can hardly reapply her original strategy in order to show that there is no problem about understanding what it is for a trying to be dependent on an agent's will-we cannot say, for example, that to have the power to try is to have the power to try as and when one tries to try. For trying is not generally something one can try to do.
This does not show, of course, that a trying could not be deterministically produced. But if a trying simply is an action-a full-blown physical action, when successful, and something less-perhaps the causing of some incipient muscular or neural motion-when not successful-it would seem as though anything that stood in the way of an action's being determined would likewise stand in the way of a trying's being determined. And so, contra Boxer, I believe my original Chapter 2 argument remains relevant. If actions have to be settlings of certain matters at the time of action, then tryings have to be settlings of certain matters at the time of action, too. And that means that at least some matters have to be left to be settled by the trying. A wholly deterministic account of their provenance cannot be correct.
Boxer might, of course, mean simply to question the premise of this argument-the premise that actions (including tryings) are settlings. The fact that she asks the question why compatibilists should attempt to explicate agency in terms of settling at all suggests as much. But I made the claim that actions are settlings as a way of explicating what I took to be a common intuition about agency-that when an agent acts, certain matters are always up to the agent at the time of action. If a compatibilist is to reject the idea that this intuition should be explicated in this way, she needs to offer us a different way of understanding this intuition, one that is compatible with determinism of at least a local sort. The most common recourse of the compatibilist at this point is to a reductive account of 'up-to-us-ness' in terms of causation by mental states. Boxer is right to point out that that may not be the only possible alternative. But the strategy she herself offers, it seems to me, will not give us this understanding without leading almost immediately to a dead end, because no way is offered in terms of which it is possible to understand what it might mean to say that whether or not to try to do something is very often up to us-and without it, we are left, effectively, without a viable compatibilism.
The second thing I would like to do in this response is to correct what I think is a mistaken interpretation of my views about what it is that agents are able to settle. Boxer seems to believe that it is my view that agents are able only to settle details concerning the movements of their own bodieswhether, for example, they move their bodies at t rather than at t + 1, or whether they move first to the left and then to the right, or vice versa, etc.and that where reasons and intentions dictate what is done, there is no agential settling. But this is absolutely not my view. Most of the time, I want to say, we are settling what we will do, and not merely when or how (in detail) we will do it. I emphasise our capacity to settle the small details only to make clear that even in those (rare) cases in which our reasons make a single course of action mandatory, there remain many things that are up to us-in particular, when to act-and when even this is dictated by our reasons, how to act (in detail). But it is extremely rare, in my view, that reasons will dictate a single course of action. Most of the time, it seems to me, reasons quite vastly underdetermine what one ought (at this very moment) to do or be doing. I currently have reasons for finishing this response, reasons for going for a swim, reasons for trying to get in touch with my daughter, reasons for reading the paper, reasons for tidying upand perhaps more radically, reasons to reassess my life entirely, to stop doing philosophy immediately and begin planning a complete change of direction. Perhaps some of these reasons are stronger than others, but why suppose that they can be precisely ordered in such a way that at any given time, one single course of action is at the top of the list, so far as practical rationality is concerned? Any such rational ordering one could supply would in most cases be at best exceedingly partial. So it is emphatically not my view that settling only begins where reasons end. Settling only begins where reasons fail to dictate a unique course of action-but that, in my view, is nearly everywhere. Settling therefore does indeed have the kind of scope that Boxer insists it must have-we settle which actions occur under the descriptions folk psychology would offer up-at least most of the time.
I want, finally, to say something very brief about Boxer's suggestion that 'laws of character' in combination with individual circumstances, might conceivably determine what one does. Perhaps there are regularities that might be called 'laws of character'-but they would seem to be related rather differently to me and my actions than the laws of physics, say, might be. For it would seem to be precisely through my settlings of things that it is determined what they are. In this respect, they seem different from the laws of physics, where it seems natural to think that they have been as they have for millions of years and that I have no chance whatever of affecting them. I therefore agree with Boxer that there is no obstacle to viewing choices as things that are determined by conjunctions of circumstances and laws of character-but that is because it is natural to think of the laws in question as emerging out of my activity in the first place. Were they written in stone in advance of my birth, and were they to dictate what I would do in every circumstance in which I might find myself, I do not see how they would permit me to settle anything at the time of action-and, hence, I do not see how they would permit me agency. (I return to these themes in my discussion of Kim Frost's paper).
III. Response to Anton Ford
Anton Ford's central claim is that I can-and should-reject the thesis that he calls corporealism. In my original response, as Ford notes, I claimed that I did not take myself to subscribe to corporealism, nor to have subscribed to it in A Metaphysics for Freedom. But Ford remains convinced that I do (or at any rate did) so subscribe and moreover, professes himself stunned at my disclaimer! In view of my very considerable stress on the power of selfmovement in A Metaphysics for Freedom, I am rather less stunned byand grateful for-his persistence in attributing to me the thesis I purported to disclaim, because it gives me the opportunity to attempt a diagnosis here of what might otherwise seem to be a puzzling dispute between us.
If we are going to be clear about whether or not I am committed to corporealism, we are going to have to be clear also about what exactly that thesis says. In his published response, Ford says merely that it is the thesis that 'agency is a power to move one's body'. 5 In his original paper, though, the thesis I am attributed in virtue of which I am said to be a corporealist is the thesis that 'agency is the power to move oneself' (my italics here); and moreover, this answer is offered as my supposed reply to the questions 'What stands to this power (the power of agency) as seeing stands to sight? What is its definitive act?' It is this answer to these questions that I meant to disavow-and this disavowal need not amount to a disavowal of the thesis that agency is a power to move one's body. Let me explain.
If one says of some power, P, that it is the power to f, the definite article here imposes a certain natural construal on the 'is' which is used in stating the thesis-what seems to be implied, it seems to me, is that the 'is' is the 'is' of definition. (If that were not already obvious, the analogy with seeing and sight, and talk of agency's 'definitive act', would, I think, settle that this was Ford's intended interpretation). And it is on this interpretation of the 'is' that I meant to deny that I believed that agency is the power to move one's body. Rather, I stated, agency should be thought of (definitionally) as the power to act. It is acting that stands to agency as seeing stands to sight. I do subscribe, of course, to the weaker claim that agency in its animal manifestations always in fact involves, in animals, the exercise of the power to move (or effect changes in) one's body. But this is different from thinking that selfmovement is the 'definitive act' by means of which the power of agency is to be specified.
How is it different? For one thing, the weaker thesis leaves open the possibility that there might conceivably be manifestations of agency that do not involve self-movement. Consider the following suggestion: the world might conceivably have been such that whenever the wind is in the east, I find myself able casually to move tables about at will in the same way as I can now casually move my arm, or twiddle distractedly and directly with a knife and fork as I can now twiddle my thumbs. The stronger definitional thesis rules these out as cases of agency; the weaker thesis does not. Or compare the following claim about a different power: vision:
(V) Vision is the power to convert patterns of light into neuronal signals and thereby obtain information about the world.
Taken as a definitional claim, (V) would rule out the presence of vision in a creature without neurons-and thus might be thought implausibly chauvinistic. But we could take (V) differently, not as a definitional, but rather as a constitutional claim concerning the basis of the power in such creatures as we currently know to possess it. Thus construed, we might think (V) true, though we would not go so far as to suggest that vision's 'definitive act' is the conversion of light into neuronal signals. So much for the bewildering dispute. I want to concede that it is certainly due, as Ford's range of quotations clearly reveals, to my own failure sufficiently to distinguish these two distinct theses when I wrote A Metaphysics for Freedom. Let me turn now to Ford's positive suggestion that it is materialism, rather than corporealism, that really offers the definitional truth about agency-agency, he suggests, is a power to transact with something or someone else. 'The "immediate object of power",' Ford claims, 'is precisely not oneself: it is neither one's body, nor one's soul, but an extra-corporeal object or a second bearer of the power.' 6 Might materialism offer a good definitional account of agency? My worry is that the extension of the concept of agency, according to materialism, is implausibly narrow. Even if one felt sympathetic to Ford's suggestion that the man drifting somewhere in outer space who can raise his arm or blink does not deserve to count as an agent in virtue merely of these truncated powers (and I think myself that that claim is implausibly strong-on my view, he is an agent, although an exceedingly limited one), one must say something about so-called 'mental' actions. Among the long list of verbs and verb phrases in terms of which we characterise our active lives come such verbs as 'consider', 'calculate', 'visualise' and 'decide'. It is hard to see how such mental activities as these are to be properly accommodated on the materialist's view. Is calculating, for example, a transaction between two different parties? If so, what are the two parties? Me and some numbers? Me and some ideas? It does not seem to me as though the transactional model of action very comfortably accommodates these instances. Perhaps the materialist believes that mental activity of this kind should indeed be regarded as falling outside the domain of action proper and so would feel unmoved by the difficulty. But that would be a very radical thesis-and one would want to hear more about the reasons for deciding to redraw the boundaries of activity so as to exclude these kinds of cases altogether from the category of the active.
Whatever the prospects for a workable materialism, is Ford right in his general suggestion that the idea that agency involves movement of the self (or the body) by the self plays no important role in A Metaphysics for Freedom and could readily be given up? I think the perspective that privileges the body and its being moved is one that is more crucial to the central argument of A Metaphysics for Freedom than Ford allows. This perspective does have an important role to play in the defence of Agency Incompatibilism. Here's why. I believe and want to argue that there is an essential connection between agency and indeterminism. But what is the essential connection, exactly? It cannot just be that whenever one acts in a certain way, it is undetermined that one will act in that way. For, of course, we often act in ways such that it might seem plausible to suppose that it is determined that we will act in those general ways-or, if it is not, that is only because of the possibility of indeterministic influences from the Universe, as it were, that do not seem to have any relation to the question whether agency itself must be indeterministic. For example, it may be determined by my being the sort of person I am, by the principles I adhere to and the reasons I recognise, that once I am there standing in the polling booth and faced with a choice between, say, two parties, that I will vote a certain way in the general election-strange and irrational sub-personal interferences with my rationality and/or physical capacities apart, perhaps. It is this sort of point that makes compatibilists feel that they must have right on their side. What I wanted to argue, though, is that, even if it were true that generally predictable and stable relations held between such things as facts about motivations and personalities, on the one hand, and facts about how agents would act, on the other, there would remain something essentially indeterministic about the activities of those agents, but one might sometimes need to descend through the levels of description, as it were, in order to be able to capture it-one might need, for instance, to recognise that each individual exercise of agency has at least some of its specific features settled by the agent at the time of action, even if there are certain general descriptions that one can very safely predict will be instantiated, provided rationality and normal motivation prevail. But to get at this, one would have to be able to describe a voting, for example, as the moving of a body part-in order to say that thus described, its occurrence was undetermined by antecedent circumstances. Similarly, it may be determined that a hungry dog put in front of a piece of meat, and not prevented from doing so, will eat it. Nevertheless, the particularities are up to the dog, are settled by it.
The vision of the Universe as one that contains animal bodies controlled and moved by the animals themselves from moment to moment thus is crucial to Agency Incompatibilism. But I deny that it is a corporealist vision in the definitional sense. It is a corporealist vision, perhaps, in another and rather weaker sense, as I have tried to explain. But we have been given no reason for thinking that in the weaker sense, corporealism might not be true; and in some respects, as I have tried to argue, it may have advantages over its materialist rival.
IV. Response to Kim Frost
Kim Frost raises a number of fascinating questions concerning the position for which I argue in A Metaphysics for Freedom. In what follows, I shall try to try to say what I can to defend the claim that it is the Agency Incompatibilist, rather than the Two-Way Compatibilist, who best captures what it is we think we attribute when we attribute agency. But Frost's paper, like Broadie's and Boxer's, makes me acutely aware that compatibilism can take far more sophisticated forms than the form on which I focused my opposition in A Metaphysics for Freedom-and I am grateful for the opportunity to think harder about some of its more subtle manifestations.
One great virtue of Frost's paper is the care it takes to distinguish different conceptions of two-way powers. At the outset of the paper, Frost mentions what he calls a 'generic' conception of a two-way power as a power that has two, mutually exclusive kinds of exercise. This conception, he says, is common both to Aristotle and to A Metaphysics for Freedom. But in fact, I am not sure this is right-for I am not sure agentive powers, as I conceive of them, really do have two, fundamentally different kinds of exercise. The reason they do not is that, for me, not exercising a power-even a two-way power-is not a way of exercising it. It is very fundamental for me that agency involves exercise; the agent has to do something in order to act. But she does not have to do anything in order not to act-and thus not acting does not count as an exercise of a two-way power. I have, for example, not exercised my power to sing over the last hour or so. But in not having thus exercised it, I do not want to say that I have all along been exercising one half-the negative half, as it were-of the power to sing or not to sing. I have not been doing any exercising of that power at all-though I have possessed it, throughout the past hour. So I don't in fact agree that a two-way power, by my lights, has two, mutually exclusive kinds of exercise. The fundamental kind of exercise of the power of singing is simply singing. Why then say that singing-like other active powers-is (normally) a two-way power? Because I am currently able both to exercise it and not to exercise it-and these abilities are connected, in that one's exercise would not count as active if the power not to exercise that ability were not simultaneously present. But this second power, in the light of which we judge the first to have the active character it does, is a power whose realisation is merely passive.
What is crucial for me, I think, to the definition of a two-way power is the point Frost makes about conditions of exercise of the power being merely necessary, rather than necessary and sufficient for its exercise. That is what is at the heart of the distinction between one-way and two-way powers, as I conceive of it. Frost suggests that Aristotle also believes that the conditions of exercise for his two-way powers are merely necessary conditions for the actual exercise of those powers. But in Aristotle's case, the insufficiency of the conditions of exercise is supposed not to lead to an absence of determinism. On the contrary, the way in which a two-way power is exercised is determined by desire. Determinism is thus alleged to be compatible with the absence of conditions of exercise for two-way powers which are sufficient. But is this combination of non-necessitation with determinism coherent? Frost comments that:
If we thought of the determining factor as just one more condition of exercise, we would perhaps lose the contrast between one-way and twoway powers, because the conditions of exercise and determining factor together would give necessary and sufficient conditions for one or other kind of exercise of an Aristotelian two-way power on an occasion. 7 But the question is why exactly desire does not count as a mere condition of the exercise of a power in one direction rather than another-and, more generally, how one is to decide what does and does not count as such a condition. For example, are all psychological conditions excluded from the class of conditions of exercise? Imagine a doctor who is overtaken periodically by acute anxiety, sufficient to prevent him from having the confidence to perform his work. His medical knowledge remains intact and once the anxiety fades, he is able to work again. Is the absence of this anxiety a condition of the exercise of the powers constituted by his knowledge of medicine? If so, we would seem to have admitted at least some conditions of exercise that are psychological-and we must find different grounds for the specific exclusion of desire. But, if not, it must be explained why exactly absence of anxiety is different from absence of, for example, temporary paralysis, which might equally impede the exercise of the powers of a medical practitioner and which surely cannot be characterised as psychological. One might have the suspicion that it will turn out to be exceedingly difficult to make the distinction between conditions of exercise and determining factor, or factors, precise. Moreover, even if it can be made precise, the resulting distinction has to be usable to ground a conception of two-way power which is metaphysically interesting. Otherwise, one might think the possession by agents of two-way powers might readily be granted, but would not serve truly to differentiate the agents from the non-agents in any way that had serious metaphysical clout. That would be a hollow victory for someone seeking to combine compatibilism with the claim that agents may be granted two-way powers.
I do not want to be too pessimistic about the possibility that desire might indeed be found to be a truly distinctive factor, which fully deserved not to be assimilated to the other conditions of exercise of a given power actively to f. Indeed, I rather think it is distinctive. But the best way I can see of making out the case for its distinctiveness actually renders the possession of two-way power, in Frost's hoped-for modified Aristotelian sense, dependent on the possession of two-way power in my incompatibilist sense. The best reason, it seems to me, for supposing that the factor of desire, thought of as that thing that explains, in all cases of rational agency, why someone exercises a particular active power in the way that they do, is that desire (in this sense) is best not thought of in general as something genuinely present antecedent to action at all. Rather, the desire to f becomes attributable after the fact, in virtue of its being apparent that an agent has f-d, and there being no special reason for thinking s/he has f-d involuntarily or inadvertently or under duress, etc. One thereby concludes that the agent must have wanted to do what she did, given that she did it-and there is no indication of any subsequent dissatisfaction on her part with what has occurred. But this is to suggest that desire is indeed not a condition of the exercise of a rational power in the sense that it is something that must be antecedently present before the action will occur. Rather, it must be ascribable post facto, if the action has occurred, and there is no special reason for thinking that action to have been, after all, some kind of manifestation of irrationality, perverseness or compulsion. But in that case, it seems to me, the action itself is not necessitated by antecedent factors-which is as much as to say that it is the agent herself who makes the determination of (settles) what is to occur, in the wake of which determination we are then able to ascribe desire. And that, it seems to me, is the position of the Agency Incompatibilist.
It may be that this point is connected to the question about whether determinism might be given a timeless formulation, which Frost raises later on in the paper. I am intrigued by this idea-but I am unsure what it can buy us. I agree that there is a conception of settling (we could call it 'determination') on which the total condition of a deterministic Universe at any point is settled by its total condition at any other, together with the laws, in the sense that it can be logically extrapolated from this information. But I do not really see how this view is to be prevented from entailing non-timeless settling of the present by the past, and of the future by the present. I remain to be convinced, I think, that there need be any surreptitious conceiving of the Universe (or perhaps its laws) as a giant substance or set of substances, in the mere view that the laws and the initial conditions together have determined the present. I can see that a mere regularity view of laws of the sort for which Ayer was doubtless arguing when he commented on the 'primitive mistake' that Frost alludes to, will serve to remove the sting of determinism, but the trouble is that I have never found regularity views of laws remotely plausible. Perhaps the key to an acceptable compatibilism might lie in showing that it is indeed possible to overcome the many objections to them.
V. Response to Alec Hinshelwood
Alec Hinshelwood's response focuses on what he calls the Separation Thesis: the claim that the movements one's body makes when one acts are the causal results of one's actions. Hinshelwood is right to suggest that I am committed to the thesis in A Metaphysics for Freedom, and right also that the argument he offers in his Section II accurately delineates the reasoning that I take to support the claim. Hinshelwood offers two arguments against the thesis-as well as a diagnosis of the mistake made by the argument for it, which is outlined in his Section II. I am fairly sure that neither of Hinshelwood's arguments against the Separation Thesis successfully defeats it; but having said that, I want to concede that I am attracted to what he says about a possible vulnerability in the argument for the claim. Though I shall defend the Separation thesis against Hinshelwood's two arguments, then, I want to do so in the context of a concession to one of his positive proposals-for I believe he may indeed have suggested a way of representing the causality that is involved in bodily agency that is potentially preferable to a model that conceptualises everything in terms of the occurrence of causally related events.
Hinshelwood's first argument begins from the premise that it is natural to think that at least a large number of bodily actions are straightforwardly perceivable by means of vision. As Hinshelwood notes, this is a premise I accept; indeed, it is one for which I have explicitly argued, making it the premise of an additional argument against the view that actions, in general, are things that are internal to the body. His thought is that there might be a problem in understanding how one may perceive the raising of an arm unless it is identical with the event of the arm's rising: 'if we were told that the obviously visible occurrence of her arm's going up is not her action but something distinct in which her action results, then we might be unsure whether we really can literally see it'. 8 But as Hinshelwood, in effect, concedes straight away, this line of thought is going to seem unpersuasive to anyone who is comfortable in general with the kind of metaphysical pluralism that might, for example, lead one to agree that a statue can be distinct from a lump of clay, despite being spatiotemporally exactly coincident with it. Once we understand the view of reality which motivates such metaphysical pluralism, we will, I think, simply feel unmoved by the worry about 'where else' one should look to see the action. The metaphysical pluralist will readily accept that there simply is nowhere else to look except in the same place as one looks in order to see the movement-just as, in the case of statue and lump, one looks in the same place to see both things.
Hinshelwood says that in the case of statue and lump we have the intimate relation of constitution to appeal to in order to understand the claim that two entities are co-present: 'the fact that the lump and the statue are perceptually indistinguishable despite being distinct surely stems from the intimate relation in which the lump stands to statue: the relation of constitution'. 9 In view of this idea about how we are to ground our understanding of the perceptual indistinguishability of things that are nevertheless distinct, he wonders whether views I have attempted to develop elsewhere concerning the relationships between processes and events might be put to work in order to argue that actions are in effect constituted by movements in the same sort of way as statues are constituted by lumps. In fact, though, I do not think this is the verdict that the framework I have attempted to develop delivers. That framework is based on utterly general ideas about aspect. As I conceive of things, there are both raisings that are processes and raisings that are events; and also risings that are processes and risings that are events (since both verbs admit of the aspectual modifications that ground the eventprocess distinction). If talk of constitution of one individual by another is appropriate here at all, then, raising processes will be constituted out of raising events-not out of rising events, as Hinshelwood's proposal has it. The process-event distinction, as I understand it, is simsponse orthogonal to the distinction between actions and (mere) movements.
Given that that is so, what are we to say in answer to Hinshelwood's worry that, unless we can appeal to constitution or a similarly 'intimate' relation, we are left with no resources by means of which to understand the claim of non-identity between action and movement? I think my inclination is to say that it is a mistake to think that it is really the relation of constitution which helps us understand the claim of non-identity in the statue-lump case. What helps us understand the claim of non-identity, it seems to me, is a philosophy of individuation-an understanding of the role played by the sortal concept in carving up the world of thinkable objects. A sortal concept picks out a substantial individual not merely by drawing a spatial, or even a spatiotemporal, boundary around it, but by drawing, as it were, modal boundaries around it-it tells us which object of thought to have under consideration, not merely which area of the spatiotemporal world is in question. And it is this that really does the work in helping with understanding the non-identity claim. Things can happen to the lump which cannot happen to the statue-and this is ultimately what underwrites its distinctness. Leibniz's Law is the ultimate criterion for individuation-different properties imply different entities. 'Constitution' is secondary-it is a word by means of which we can talk about the relationship between the individuals that are singled out by two important kinds of sortal concept that tend to deliver coincident individuals-substance concepts and, let us call them, portion concepts-like 'lump' or 'piece' or 'chunk'. But we should not assume that constitution is the central-and certainly we should not assume that it is the only-case of non-identity with spatiotemporal coincidence.
If we let go of the thought that the relation of constitution itself is explanatory, and turn instead to the thought that it is rather a certain philosophy of individuation which helps us see why we need to distinguish things that might nevertheless be in the same place at the same time, then it might be clearer how to argue for the distinctness of raising and rising. Once again, it is Leibniz's Law that is key. Most obviously, the raising is by me it is a doing-the rising is not. The raising can be, for example, eager (suppose I raise my arm to answer a quiz question)-but an arm cannot rise eagerly. A verdict of distinctness is, in my view, dictated by such simple facts as these -and in the face of such facts, the assumptions on which the argument for perceptual distinguishability is based must be rejected.
What of the second argument? Hinshelwood claims that given the Separation Thesis, it is hard to see how the agent could know without observation or inference that her raising of her arm falls under that description-since it does so, on the Separation Thesis, only in virtue of the raising's having caused a distinct event-a rising-and the fact that the rising has occurred would seem to be the sort of thing that could only be known by means of observation or inference. But the issue here seems to me quite independent of the Separation thesis. That someone is raising their arm implies, surely, that their arm is rising, whatever one thinks about the Separation Thesis-and this propositional relationship is quite sufficient all by itself to give rise to the worry about how agents' knowledge is possible, without any help from the Separation thesis. How can one know without observation or inference that one is raising one's arm if that implies that one's arm is rising?-and if one needs observation to know that one's arm is rising? I am unsure what to think about what the correct solution to this problem might be-but it seems to me that the problem has nothing particular to do with the Separation Thesis-it is a problem for everyone who believes that agents' knowledge is of a privileged sort and who admits the validity of the inference. Doubtless, as Hinshelwood surmises, the correct solution will involve a proper appreciation of how proprioception, as well as intention, figures in our knowledge of what we are doing. But the Separation Thesis is not the source of the problem.
Having said all this in defence of the Separation Thesis, I want to finish by conceding that I think what Hinshelwood says at the end of his paper about the vulnerability of premise (3) in the argument for the Separation Thesis is worth serious consideration. It may perhaps not follow from the fact that in raising my arm I cause my arm to move that I cause an event of my arm's moving-and if it did not follow, then we might have cause to question whether the Separation Thesis is true. I think we would need to hear more about how, when an arm is caused to move by an agent, it could fail to be the case that the agent had caused an event of an arm's moving-but perhaps there is something to be said here. Perhaps causing things to change is not always the same thing as causing changes. Or perhaps it is rather that changes are not always best conceived of as individual events. I am open to, and interested in, these suggestions-but I think they need further development before we could decide definitively to embrace them, and perhaps consequently to abandon the Separation Thesis.
VI. Response to Christos Douskos
Christos Douskos's extremely thought-provoking paper suggests that my account of agency-and, more specifically, my attempt to characterise the distinction between bodily movements and changes that are agential and those that are non-agential-suffers from two main shortcomings. In what follows, I shall try to suggest that the second issue he highlights is not a genuine problem for my account, since it seems to be based on the attribution to me of a thesis I do not hold. I want to concede, though, that the first issue Douskos raises is indeed a problem. The considerations he puts forward do succeed in showing, I think, that the account of the agential/non-agential distinction offered in A Metaphysics for Freedom is inadequate to do the work required of it. I shall try therefore to make some suggestions as to how the inadequacy might be made good-but these suggestions are only really a starting point for what will need eventually to be a more developed response.
Let me begin with the second issue. The problem is said to arise from what Douskos labels the 'Guidance Control Condition', to which he thinks I am committed. According to the Guidance Control Condition, if the execution of some movement is to count as agential, the agent must be able to produce movements that satisfy d as opposed to d' by the operation of intentional states/processes, where d and d' are, I think, intended to be physical descriptions of movements that are only slightly different from one another. Douskos objects that as these descriptions, d and d', grow more and more specific, it becomes implausible to suppose that we have the requisite abilities to produce motions that satisfy one such description rather than the other, since no agent has the power to ensure that her bodily movements are in conformity with utterly specific descriptions. I agree. But the words of the Guidance Control Condition are Douskos's and not mine. The initial attribution to me of something like this condition seems to be based on what I say about the example of dancing-Douskos says that I claim that 'although someone might not "specifically intend to make" movements of certain kinds while dancing she must be able to produce movements of just these kinds by the operation of intentional processes'. 10 But this is not what I said and it is not what I meant. What I say is that, although someone might not specifically intend to make certain movements that she in fact makes when dancing, she can bring these movements 'under control' at a moment's notice. But this does not mean that she must be able to produce movements 'of just these kinds by the operation of intentional processes'. What I meant by speaking of the agent's bringing them under control was that she will be able, for example, to stop flexing her foot, or perform the arabesque more quickly, or with a straighter back, or whatever. I meant that by focusing on those movements, she will be able to bring them within the ambit of attentional processes, at least to some degree. I did not mean that for any description whatever of the produced motion, however specific, the agent must be able to produce a movement that conforms to that description.
It is true that I stipulated in A Metaphysics for Freedom that agential processes must be processes that can be brought under control at a moment's notice. So Douskos is right that there is a modal element to the account. And he is right, too, that in responding to certain sorts of cases that might be thought to be counterexamples to the view of agency as settling, I point out that for any given f-ing, it may be that there are cases in which the agent is unable not to f-but that, provided there is some description of the f-ing, say as a d-ing, such that the agent is able not to d, the f-ing may still satisfy the condition for being a settling (since it will be a settling at least of whether or not a d-ing occurs). But none of this implies that an agent must be able, for any particular d, to act in a way that conforms to that description (as opposed to some other). All that is implied is that in each case that is a genuine case of agency, there must be some description of the action as a ding such that the agent is able not to d. Any action must be a non-compulsory exercise of the agent's powers of self-movement and self-change-that is the thought. And if it is a non-compulsory exercise of those powers, there must be some description under which the non-compulsoriness shows itself. But that is a far cry from being able to produce d as opposed to d' for maximally specific d and d'. My condition on agency is specified as what I called a refrainment power-what is crucial is that the agent needs the ability not to d for some d, if an individual d-ing is to be an action. Douskos's Guidance Control Condition, on the other hand, places a very strong positive condition on the abilities whose exercise constitutes agency. Being able not to produce d, though, does not imply being able to produce d'.
So much for the second issue. Let me turn now to the first. Douskos objects that the extension of the agency concept to which I am committed is problematic. In order to bring subintentional actions into the realm of the agential, I suggested in A Metaphysics for Freedom that we might rely on what Douskos rightly calls a modal criterion-these phenomena count as agential, I suggested, in virtue of their accessibility to direct and intentional agential control. But this, Douskos rightly points out, allows far too much in. Breathing, for example, is certainly not normally an agential process; it is an automatic one, which goes on without our needing to guide it, control it or take any agential part in it. Nevertheless, it is possible for me to exert a certain amount of intentional control over my breathing, should I decide I want to do so. I can, for example, hold my breath, at least for a short time, and breathe more deeply, or more quickly or slowly, usually by simply trying to do so. The criterion I suggested, therefore, will not do. Something other than a merely modal criterion is going to be needed to exclude breathing from counting as agential even when it is not the focus of any agential attention.
Consider the difference between a Parkinsonian hand tremor, say, and an agent's rhythmic but absent minded tapping along to a piece of music. The former is clearly non-agentive; the latter is the sort of thing I am anxious to include in the category of the active, along with such things as hand gestures and 'nervous' activities, such as rubbing one's chin, readjusting one's glasses, scratching one's head, fiddling with one's jewellery. What is the difference? Not merely, as the line taken in A Metaphysics for Freedom suggested, that I am able to stop the tapping but not the tremor, or change the rhythm of the former but not of the latter. It is not merely that the latter sorts of process could be controlled that makes them different from the former, but that they are clearly being controlled already. What I think Douskos has shown is that a satisfactory account of the agential character of these sub-intentional actions and activities will have to try to say something about this processual, ongoing control. A purely modal strategy will not work, for the reasons Douskos gives.
It is clear that the control that is apparent in these sub-intentional cases is not fully intentional control. Intention is usually presumed to go along with knowledge, and as is often pointed out, one may be engaging in these activities without necessarily knowing that one is doing so-one may respond to being told to stop by saying: 'Oh, sorry!-I didn't realise I was doing it!' But perhaps there is room for manoeuvre in the recognition that there can be agential awareness that falls short of the sort of knowledge that goes along with intention, and that such lesser grades of knowledge might go along, in these sub-intentional cases, with what might be called a lesser grade of meant-ness than is found in full-blown intentionality. One may not intend to be fiddling with one's jewellery. But nevertheless, there is a sense in which the movements, one might think, are meant. I do not grasp randomly-but at my jewellery-and the movements I make display a variety of rather fine control. Moreover, it is not as though-even if I did not realise I was doing it at the time-I do not now realise that I was doing it-and this realisation need not be based only on the fact that I have been told so. I may now be dimly aware that I have indeed been fiddling with my jewellery, and as I cast my mind back I may even be able to recall certain periods of the fiddling. What I am inclined to try to explore, then, in searching for a better answer to the question how to distinguish the agential from the non-agential than the one I provided in A Metaphysics for Freedom is the thought that there is a kind of meant-ness that falls short of intendedness which will serve to bring sub-intentional actions of these sorts into the fold of the agentive-while excluding automatic processes such as breathing and blinking. I do not yet have this account to hand-but I look forward to trying to develop it, and I thank Douskos for making it so plain that some such account needs to be provided if I am to make good on my claim that agency can and ought to be characterised without excessive reliance on the idea of mental causation.
VII. Response to Sean Clancy
Sean Clancy's paper, like Broadie's and Boxer's, charges me with having taken on only a less good version of compatibilism than is potentially available. As already explained, I have come to think, since I wrote A Metaphysics for Freedom, that this charge is probably fair in many waysbut I do not think the specific version of this challenge which Clancy levels at my view meets its mark. I begin by explaining why, in my view, it does not do so-before going on to consider the interesting case of Rufus that he presents towards the end of his paper.
As Clancy notes, I believe that one matter on which he takes issue with me is not in fact a real point of disagreement between us. I offered the so-called 'weak' conception of settling in Chapter 2 merely to concede the possibility that one might reasonably use the word 'settle' in a rather different and less metaphysically committed way than the way in which I wanted to use it. I did not in fact mean to offer it, as Clancy supposed, as the account of agential settling which compatibilists would be likely to endorse. Like Clancy, I think the natural account of agential settling for a compatibilist to embrace is bound to involve some reference to the agent's mental states. Nevertheless, I do not think the Strong Compatibilist Account of Settling, as Clancy characterises it, will do (even for the compatibilist, as it were). The main difficulty is that it is not the notion of agential settling (settling that is done by an agent) that Clancy wants to characterise by reference to counterfactual dependence on the agent's mental states, but the very notions of settled-ness and unsettled-ness themselves. Thus, for example, he claims that 'The question of whether-p is unsettled iff whether-p is counterfactually responsive to the mental states of some agent.' 11 But this cannot be right as a general account of unsettledness. Intuitively, things can be unsettled even though they are not counterfactually dependent on the states of any agent-they might be unsettled, for instance, because they are dependent on the outcome of some indeterministic process that has nothing to do with agency at all-for example on the emission of some particle from a radioactive atom. The notions of settled-ness and unsettled-ness are general ideas in terms of which we might hope to characterise our ideas about the fixity or unfixity of things-they have, in and of themselves, nothing to do with agency. It is only the notion of agential settling which might conceivably be characterised by appeal to the idea of counterfactual dependence on an agent's mental states.
Suppose, though, that we prescind from the details of Clancy's particular version of the Strong Compatibilist Account and consider simply the idea that agential settling, at any rate, might be definable in terms of the notion of counterfactual dependence on an agent's mental states. S agentially settles at t whether-p, one might try suggesting, if and only if whether-p is (i) counterfactually responsive to S's mental states at t and (ii) not counterfactually responsive to anyone's mental states at any time subsequent to t; and (iii) metaphysically settled at all times subsequent to t (where 'metaphysically settled' would have to be defined in a different way from the way in which Clancy himself defines it). If determinism is true, since all matters will be metaphysically settled at all times, the third clause will always be satisfied; if it is not, this clause will be required to prevent S from being able to settle matters that depend on the outcome of indeterministic events occurring subsequently to any point of counterfactual responsiveness to S's mental states. This definition would have the consequence that agents could settle matters by omitting to do things they could have done, as well as by actingbut I see no reason for thinking that is necessarily problematic. Surely agents 11 Clancy, 'Strong Compatibilist Account of Settling ', 656. do often settle certain matters when they omit to do certain things they could have done. One would also need to decide what to say about cases in which there are 'ties' between agents for the role of settler of a given matter. But otherwise, this looks to me as though it would be a serviceable-looking version of an account that would meet the desiderata that seem to me important to Clancy's argument. In particular, the account would retain its reliance on the notion of counterfactual dependence, rather than the notion of causation, and this is important. For Clancy's main claim is that Strong Compatibilist Settling can occur even if the Causal Theory of Action is false, and hence can escape the criticisms that I levelled at the Causal Theory of Action in A Metaphysics for Freedom, even if those criticisms are effective. Let us turn, then, to look at the argument by means of which he tries to establish that this is so. To try to show that the compatibilist who wishes to embrace the notion of settling need not also embrace the Causal Theory of Action, Clancy offers a description of an agent, Rufus, whose propositional attitudes are not, he says, the simple causes of his actions-for there is also Rufus-the-agent in the picture. Here is what he says:
Rufus is composed of more than one part. One part is Rufus-the-agent, and another part consists of Rufus's attitudes. Rufus's actions are produced by Rufus-the-agent, rather than by Rufus's attitudes. Nevertheless, it seems that Rufus's attitudes will often make a difference to what Rufus-the-agent does. Rufus might want to save money on gasoline-this may be a reason for him to take the bus. Rufus may also want to avoid riding with other people-this may be a reason for him not to take the bus. Since the universe is deterministic, there is only one physically possible future, determined by Rufus's attitudes and mental states, as well as whatever internal conditions Rufus-the-agent has. Suppose that Rufus is, in fact, determined to board the bus. Suppose also that counterfactually, if Rufus had different mental states, he would not board the bus . . . Because the question of whether-Rufus-boards-the-bus is counterfactually responsive to Rufus's mental states, it is unsettled in the strong compatibilist sense. 12 I take it that the point of this example is to show that strong compatibilist settling is compatible with the falsity of the Causal Theory of Action-and also, of course, with determinism (that is what makes it compatibilist, after all!). But I am doubtful that it presents us with a coherent possibility. Quite apart from the general worries surrounding any version of agent causationism according to which agents cause their actions which I discuss and endorse in A Metaphysics for Freedom, what I fail to see is what content there is in the claim that Rufus's actions are produced by 'Rufus-the-agent', given that in Clancy's imagined scenario, the 'part' of Rufus that consists of his attitudes appears to determine everything. Perhaps Clancy would object that this is not so-that there are also the 'internal conditions' which Rufusthe-agent has, to be considered. So be it-then we merely have determination by a slightly wider set of properties of the whole, composite entity that is Rufus. And what I fail to see is how, given that this is the set-up, there is any causal role at all for Rufus-the-agent to play. What settles the outcome is not Rufus, but his properties (some of which are attitudinal properties, such as wanting to save money on gasoline, and some of which are these unspecified 'internal conditions').
In discussion, Clancy indicated, I think, that he believed the burden of explanation and elucidation here lay with me. I think he would say that it is not he, but I, who am inclined to insist that sense can be given to the idea of an agent's determining something (e.g. that he will board the bus at t), as opposed to the agent's states or properties determining that same thing-and hence that whatever account I am inclined to give of the relevant 'agent causation' that is involved when an agent settles something can simply be plugged into his account of what happens when Rufus produces his actions, to serve as a description of what is going on in the relevant 'part' of Rufus. But this misses the point that it is utterly crucial to my view that agent causation of the type I endorse can only exist at all in an indeterministic universe; since settlings of outcomes by agents (i.e. actions) are only possible if actions are non-necessitated. By my lights, Rufus cannot be producing his actions (or even, as I would insist we should say, his movements) while at the same time various properties of his simply determine that they will occur. The necessitation simply rules out any agent-causal role for Rufus. So my account of agent causation cannot simply be plugged in to supply Clancy's model of Rufus with the metaphysical underpinnings it needs. To think it could be is simply to beg the question against Agency Incompatibilism.
Of course, the compatibilist will want to dispute the suggestion that actions can only exist in an indeterministic universe, as I claim. But that is to return us to the original point of dispute. Clancy has not given us an argument for thinking that strong compatibilist settling is consistent with the existence of actions whose status as actions is independent of the ideacentral to the Causal Theory of Action -that actions are produced by the agent's mental states; for he has neither supplied an alternative account of what an action is supposed to be, nor is it dialectically legitimate here to demand that I supply it.
VIII. Response to Michael Garnett
Michael Garnett suggests in his very interesting response that it might be helpful to make a separation between two different facets of the Challenge from Chance: these he calls 'the agency problem' and 'the rational cost problem'. I do not unfortunately have the space to consider properly everything he says; I shall confine myself to the very interesting 'Crazy Singer' case, which Garnett uses to suggest that my response to the rational cost problem cannot be satisfactory. The rational cost problem, as explicated by Garnett, is this:
if a free agent's processes of practical reasoning necessarily contain elements of randomness or chance, then a free agent must always be at risk of acting irrationally. . . Yet this means that the freedom on which the libertarian insists is simply the freedom to be irrational, which is a freedom that, surely, we would be better off without. 13 Let me first reiterate that the version of libertarianism that I intended to espouse in A Metaphysics for Freedom is meant to avoid commitment to the view that a free agent's processes of practical reasoning necessarily contain elements of randomness or chance of a sort liable to involve the agent in irrationality. Joe's processes of practical reasoning, for instance, when they are applied to the question whether or not to move in with his girlfriend, rather than staying put in his miserable bedsit, will have simply failed him if they do not (at some point) arrive at the conclusion that he ought to moveand I wanted to concede that it is therefore good if there is a type of determination here. What seems desirable is that what Joe decides should be determined by his reasons, at least in a case like this, in which his reasons make one course of action indisputably the best available. And where (practical) reason dictates one answer, we should of course hope for our concrete processes of reasoning to be such as to produce that same answer. But it does not follow that the event that is Joe's deciding to move in has to be deterministically caused by its antecedents if Joe is to avoid irrationality. That event is a specific occurrence that has a number of properties, quite apart from the property of being a decision with a certain content-for one thing, it is a decision that takes place at a particular time, and provided there is no particular reason for Joe to make his decision at the specific time at which he does (as there rarely is in ordinary cases) one cannot move from 'the conclusion of the practical reasoning should be determined by Joe's reasons, in a clear case such as this' (which is true) to 'the particular occurrence which is the event of Joe's deciding to move in with his girlfriend should be causally determined by its antecedents, in a clear case such as this' (which, I maintain, is false). Causal determinism concerning the individual events which are our actions is not, I wanted to suggest, a necessarily desirable concomitant of the rational determination of the answer to a practical question by the reasons for and against the various answers on offer.
It is natural though, to ask at this point (as Garnett does) what is to be said about cases in which there are reasons for performing an action at a particular time-for example right now. This is the point of Garnett's 'Crazy Singer' case. In the Crazy Singer case, there are reasons for pressing the button at the particular time that Singer wants it pressed. And so, if I have those reasons prior to my pressing the button at the time that Singer specifies I must press it, it might seem as though, given the structure of my motivation, there is no metaphysical possibility at the time of action that I will do anything else-or at least, none whose existence could possibly be a condition of my freedom or agency. Perhaps there is some chance that I might, say, freeze with terror as the countdown reaches '9' and consign my beloved family to death at Singer's hands. But it might seem implausible that my freedom could depend upon such an irritating possibility as this.
In A Metaphysics for Freedom, I thought I would be able to concede that in such artificially constrained situations, there might indeed be no possibility of a kind that is relevant to my freedom or agency of my not f-ing at tand I pointed out that there would remain, nevertheless, other things that my action would settle (e.g. which particular bodily movement would occur). Garnett suggests that this response is inadequate, because he thinks that an action that is a f-ing ought to be a settling of whether one f-s. I agree that it ought be a settling of whether one f-s, in the sense that whether one f-s ought to be determined by ones reasons and motivations. But it does not seem to me to follow that it must be a metaphysical settling of whether one f-s in the sense that the fact that I will f is settled only as I act (and not before). To deny that agents can truly settle matters in this way is not to treat reasons themselves as constraints on the scope of one's agency; it is only to treat them as constraints with respect to the limited question whether one will or will not f, which, in such cases as the Crazy Singer case, they surely are. But each exercise of agency is still the metaphysical settling of a range of questions-so that a rational constraint on the answer to one, or even a few, of those questions does not amount to a constraint on the scope of one's agency itself. In pressing the button, even in the Crazy Singer case, one performs an action-albeit, an action that falls under some descriptions such that it was entirely predictable that one would act thus.
However, I am worried by reflecting on the Crazy Singer scenario for reasons other than those mentioned by Garnett. For might not Garnett's strategy be extended? Might it not be possible for Crazy Singer to constrain every feature of the action he wants me to perform, down to the tiniest level of detail? Suppose he specifies, for example, that I am to push the button with my right hand, at 10 a.m. on the dot, by means of a push with the following characteristics-etc., etc. Then I have a very strong motivation for at least attempting to do as he says-even if perhaps the specification might conceivably outrun my powers of compliance. It is probably not settled in advance that I will perform an entirely Singer-compliant action, because probably no agent is actually able to comply with the instruction to produce a totally specific bodily movement. I will thus doubtless still settle things, therefore, when my action occurs-inevitably, by virtue of my inability to comply with any totally specific instruction of this kind. But one might reasonably wonder whether this accident of powerlessness could possibly be the place where the essence of agency is located. Suppose I was better at controlling my movements than human beings generally are-suppose I could bring about a maximally specific bodily movement at will. Would the mere fact that I could be relied upon to produce it perfectly mean that my production of it would no longer be an action of mine?
I think this thought experiment is extremely instructive-and that perhaps it suggests the importance of a factor that I overlooked in A Metaphysics for Freedom. What I think it raises is the question whether, given the enhanced powers of bodily control I have imagined, I still have to exert effort in the execution of the movement in question, in order to get it right. Perhaps even though the movement is well within my powers to bring about, I still have, for example, to concentrate, to avoid getting distracted, to exercise care and attention. Or perhaps I actively have to try not to concentrate-perhaps I know that such concentration might put me off, and that the best strategy is to attempt to forget the importance attaching to the action in this particular case. Either way, though, there is something that is up to me to get right. In that case, my intuition is that we still have an action-it is in the deployment of the necessary care and attention that we see the agent's settling of what occurs. Consider: someone might offer me the chance to be hooked up to a machine which will simply ensure that the movement that is produced meets the Singer specifications-all I have to do is sit there with my finger attached to the device and it will ensure that my finger does exactly the right thing at the right moment. I might gladly hook myself up to avoid the stressfulness of actually having to execute such an important movement myself. Hooked up to the machine, the movement becomes a mere movement-my immediate bodily control over the action is suspended. But without it, I remain an agent -since, even if it is the case that the production of the wanted specific movement is generally easy for me, there is still execution here-execution that could conceivably go wrong. I am an executor of an action, one might think, where the possibility of success or failure depends on what I called in A Metaphysics for Freedom, top-level control.
What consideration of this extension of the Crazy Singer case suggests to me, then, is that perhaps contra my original position, there actually is a metaphysical possibility of not pressing the button at t which I should care about even in Garnett's original, less constrained case. The possibility in question is the possibility of failure that is kept at bay by the deployment of the care and concentration I have to exercise in ensuring that I do press the button at the right time.
